Earnings management is a key issue for financial reporting. The purpose of this paper is to derive a set of indices to measure the pervasiveness of earnings management (PEM) using the properties of quarterly accrual volatility. The PEM index can be viewed as a quality measure of financial reporting and an effectiveness measure for financial monitoring.
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Earnings management is a key issue for financial reporting. The purpose of this paper is to derive a set of indices to measure the pervasiveness of earnings management (PEM) using the properties of quarterly accrual volatility. The PEM index can be viewed as a quality measure of financial reporting and an effectiveness measure for financial monitoring.
1 In contrast to mean-shifting studies in the literature, our measure based on accrual volatility yields two major advantages. First, it relieves us of the necessity of precise assumptions regarding economic events. Second, it provides a macro-perspective on the overall patterns in earnings management. The methodology based on accrual volatility can address issues like the earnings quality, the nature of the informational environment, and the effect of accounting standard setting.
Previous method of detecting earnings management focuses on "mean-shifting" effect: managers are hypothesized to respond to economic events by adjusting accruals in a particular direction for a particular economic motive. This method cannot examine broader trends in the prevalence of earnings management, and macro-issues of information environment. In this paper, we use the properties of seasonal accrual volatility to derive an indirect measure of the pervasiveness of earnings management. 2 Our key assumption states that the bulk of earnings management occurs mainly in the last days of each fiscal year for meeting mangers' objectives. The seasonal pattern of accrual volatility can provide a trace of earnings management, even in the absence of further information about specific economic events and resulting managerial actions. 3 Our working hypothesis is that pervasive earnings management leads to the first order stochastic dominance of fourth quarter accrual volatility over the other three quarters.
We provide evidence on the relations between previously documented drivers of earnings management and seasonal accrual heteroskedasticity. These drivers include executive compensation, regulatory requirements, bond covenants, and political costs. This empirical support of our working hypothesis validates our application of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Distance to measure the pervasiveness of earnings management (PEM). We use raw total accruals as the basis for measuring PEM1 and use residuals from Jones' (1991) model to control for mechanical factors in our measurement of PEM2. The usefulness of controls is an empirical issue. Our results suggest that additional controls do not add much power to detect earnings management over and above the simplest measure based on total accruals.
KS Distance is powerful in detecting the difference around the central locations of two distributions, but not powerful at the tail ends. We develop two other measures for PEM. First, we estimate the fraction of fourth quarter accruals volatility exceeding the 95 th percentile value for the first three quarters (base period) distribution. This fraction, reduced by 5%, constitutes PEM3. Second, we design a simulation method to determine PEM4 as the percentage of firms with a given magnitude of accrual adjustment for the base period accrual volatility to match that of the fourth quarter. Both PEM3 and PEM4
are estimates of percentage of firms involved in earnings management of a given magnitude. However, we should note here that our PEM indices are more likely ordinal than cardinal measures.
Though our methods of measuring PEM rely on indirect measurement, we provide direct evidence on the relevance of our method through a series of external validation checks. First, we use a subsample of firms subject to SEC actions relating to alleged earnings manipulation. This data was collected from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER's) by the SEC. 4 We compare PEM's for the AAER sample to PEM's for the COMPUSTAT sample to assess the power of our measures. The PEM indices for the AAER sample are two to three times as large as the PEM indices for the COMPUSTAT sample. Though we avoid interpreting the relative magnitudes literally, these differences do suggest a positive correlation between our PEM indices and the degree of earnings management. Second, we conduct case studies for 10 firms identified by fourth quarter accrual volatility as strongly suspect of earnings management. These studies show that suspect firms frequently engage in activities associated with earnings management, such as CEO turnover, restructuring, public offerings, or they experience losses. Applying our PEM indices to COMPUSTAT data, we find that pervasiveness of earnings management has been relatively stable in the period of 1988-1996.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze the possible seasonal behavior of accounting accruals and derive various indirect measurements of PEM. Empirical results are presented in section 2. Checks on robustness and discussion of the economic relevance of our findings regarding the pervasiveness of earnings management are provided in section 3. In the final section, we make concluding remarks.
Measurement of PEM

Intra-Year Timing of Earnings Management
Our method is based on the premise that earnings management primarily takes place near the fiscal year end. With many forces in action, managers have to weigh among alternative motives, calculate a target earnings level, compare with actual results, and finally decide in what direction and to what degree to manage earnings. In the early interim periods, there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning both the management incentives and the actual results. Only later in the year or at the very year-end is the uncertainty resolved or significantly reduced. Therefore, the closer to the fiscal year end, the less the uncertainty would be, and the more active earnings management would be.
5 Foster (1986, pp. 225-226) gives a number of examples of such intra-year timing of earnings management. From an institutional perspective, there are two distinct approaches to interim reporting in GAAP: the discrete approach views an interim period in the same way as an annual period; the integral approach views an interim period as a component part of the annual period. APB Opinion 28 generally favors the integral approach. Under this approach, the fourth quarter becomes a "dumping ground" (Collins, et al., 1984) in that various adjustments are made in the fourth quarter in order for the interim results to be consistent with the annual results. Various auditing techniques such as the cutoff test and the kiting test are designed to deal with the year-end discretion (e.g., Arens and Loebbecke, 1994) .
Earnings management may go either direction if not conditional on specific motives. Thus, higher intensity of earnings management should be reflected in the higher accrual volatility. The increased incidence of earnings management in the fourth quarter will increase the volatility of fourth quarter accruals. The other three quarters with relative lower earnings management intensity comprise the base period for comparison. Formally, we state our working hypothesis as follow:
Hypothesis: Earnings Management Leads to First-Order Stochastic Dominance of Fourth Quarter Accrual
Volatility over the Base Period.
Accrual Volatility
The derivation of PEM indices is based on the relative magnitude of fourth quarter accrual volatility to the base period of the first three quarters. Accrual volatility is measured by the absolute value of accruals. We apply the Jones' Model (1991) to control for mechanical adjustments. The controlling factors include total assets, change in revenues, and gross property plant and equipment.
The residuals from (1), called discretionary accruals (DA) in the literature, provide an estimate of quarterly accruals purged of mechanical adjustments. We take the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ADA) as the basis for deriving PEM2.
KS Distance and PEM Indices
Our PEM indices are based on comparisons of the distributions of accrual volatility between the base period and the fourth quarter. For PEM1 and PEM2, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) Distance to measure first order stochastic dominance of the fourth quarter accrual volatility over the other three quarters. The KS Distance is the maximum vertical distance between the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the two random variables. Since the KS Distance follows an asymptotic limiting distribution given in Smirnov (1939) , we can construct an index that not only has the convenient feature of being bounded in [0, 1] , but also has the valuable feature of having known statistical properties. 7 The KS Distance does not require the accrual volatility to follow a parametric distribution.
We apply KS Distance to total accruals to get PEM1, and to the residuals from the Jones Model to get PEM2. Conover (1980) points out that the KS Distance is powerful in the center of the distributions, even when the distributions are not well behaved. But, it is not powerful for measuring first order stochastic dominance in the tails of the distributions. To measure the behavior at the right tail of the distribution, we develop PEM3 and PEM4. For PEM3, we define θ as the value at the 95 th percentile of absolute total accruals (ATA) for the base period, and then find the fraction of fourth quarter ATA exceeding θ. We subtract 5% from this fraction, as 5% is the expected proportion of absolute accruals exceeding θ under the null hypothesis of no earnings management. The resulting value is PEM3. 8 Hence while PEM1 and PEM2
focus on the patterns of "common" earnings management, PEM3 measures the pervasiveness of large earnings management. We report the result using measures based on Absolute Total Accruals (ATA), but extensive additional work yielded qualitatively similar results when Absolute Discretionary Accruals (ADA) are used instead.
The distance between fourth quarter and based period accrual volatility distributions depends on the magnitude of earnings management and the percentage of firms involved in earnings management.
Assuming a given magnitude of earnings management, we can estimate the pervasiveness from this distributional distance. PEM4 is derived from a simulation that randomly adds accruals of a given magnitude to existing observations in the base period and compares the resulting distribution to the fourth quarter distribution. The simulation can be summarized in the following four steps: PEM4 can be interpreted as the percentage of firms engaged in earnings management of a given magnitude.
We should view all PEM indices as ordinal measures at this early stage of methodological development.
Empirical Results
Sample Selection
We obtain our sample from the 1997 COMPUSTAT Industrial Files quarterly database, which covers from the first quarter of 1987 to the third quarter of 1997. The sample consists of all firm/quarters that satisfy following selection criteria:
1) The necessary firm quarter data have no missing values.
2) The firm is not a financial institution (SIC 6000 to 6999), or unclassified (SIC > 9900).
3) There are at least 24 firm quarter observations per regression where relevant.
Since most firms included in the sample have consecutive quarterly observations in a given year, the third criterion roughly requires a minimum of six firms per industry per year for sample inclusion. After discretionary accruals are obtained from the preliminary regressions, we trim our sample by deleting those firm quarters with discretionary accruals, operating cash flows, or nondiscretionary accruals in the extreme 1% of the entire distribution.
Our final sample comprises 77,574 firm quarters from 4,116 firms in 51 (364) 2-digit (4-digit) SIC code industries. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the major variables used in the empirical analysis below. The table is divided into three panels roughly representing the estimation strategy followed in the analysis. The first panel presents fundamental measures of the sample firms, while the second and third panels present regression variables used in Tables 2 and 3 . Where appropriate, variables are scaled by book value of assets to facilitate comparison across firms.
Insert Table 1 Here
Overall the firm size distribution based on average assets (Ave_A) for our sample is representative in that it lies between the distributions for all firms reported by COMPUSTAT and the distribution for NYSE firms, based on a comparison of the quartile values reported in Table 1 to values extracted from the full COMPUSTAT universe for the same time period. Similarly, when annualized the distribution of net income is similar to the distributions for the full COMPUSTAT and NYSE firms over the same time period. Total accrual (TA) is the difference between net income and operating cash flows (measured by COMPUTSTAT quarterly items 8 and 108, respectively) 9 , and this variable serves as the starting point for our measures of PEM. In particular, PEM1 is based on the absolute value of total accruals (ATA). PEM2 is based on accruals purged of mechanical factors, or absolute discretionary accruals (ADA).
The second panel of Table 1 describes regressors used in the Jones Model (assets is presented in the previous panel). The third panel shows regressors for seasonal accrual volatility, though dummy variable distributions are not reported. Discussion of these variables and their use in regressions is deferred to Table 3 .
It should be noted here that Tax_diff is defined as the difference between the fourth quarter realization of the effective tax rate and the estimated rate used in the first three quarters. Hence it is normalized to zero for the first three quarters, and the summary statistics represent only fourth quarter values.
Insert Tables 2 Here
The estimation of Jones Model is based on the cross-sectional regressions for each combination of two-digit SIC codes and fiscal year, pooling the quarterly observations within the year (see Subramanyam (1996) for detail). Hence we estimate a total of 436 regressions for the Jones Model. Table 2 presents the regression results. Both estimates and tests are consistent with the results in the literature. 10 The mean adjusted R 2 is 6.9%. The discretionary accruals (DAs) are measured as the residuals from the regressions.
The absolute value of DA (ADA) is used as the basis for deriving PEM2 and as the dependent variable in the examination of the association between accrual volatility and earnings management in Table 3 .
Earnings Management and Seasonal Accrual Heteroskedasticity
Our measurement of PEM is based on the premise that earnings management leads to seasonal accrual heteroskedasticity. The first step for establishing the validity of our measurement is to show empirical validity of this working hypothesis. Table 3 provides direct evidence by using regression results from equation (2):
The dependent variable, ADA, is the absolute value of the Jones Model residual, which provides an estimate of accrual volatility purged of mechanical factors. When we substitute ATA for ADA, the results are similar to those in Table 3 . Control for mechanical factors using Jones Model does not matter much in our analysis of heteroskedasticity. The approach used in equation (2) is similar to Glesjer's (1969) approach to modeling determinants of heteroskedasticity.
We specify four groups of explanatory variables z in Table 3 . The first is a set of seasonal dummies that measure the unconditional seasonal pattern in accrual volatility. The second is a set of industry dummies to control for differences in accrual patterns across industries due to unobserved factors. The third group includes potential earnings management drivers suggested in previous literature. 11 The fourth group is intended to measure the differential effect of earnings management drivers in the fourth quarter compared to the first three quarters, the main variables of interest in Table 3 . The empirical significance of the last set of explanatory variables provides validity to our working hypothesis that earnings management leads to seasonal accrual heteroskedasticity. This working hypothesis allows us to construct indirect indices based on quarterly accrual volatility for measuring the pervasiveness of earnings management.
Specification 1 in Table 3 shows the pattern of accruals across quarters and industries. It is immediately apparent that accrual volatility is higher in the fourth quarter. Specification 2 adds the earnings management drivers, discussed individually below. Specification 3 uses earnings management drivers without the quarter and industry effects. The difference between specifications 2 and 3 shows that the earnings management drivers explain most of the variance and are relatively stable estimates with respect to the inclusion of the dummies. Specification 4 omits insignificant variables in specification 3 and any further variables that subsequently become insignificant. The remaining set are all statistically significant at conventional levels, and show that at least some measures associated with earning management, including the tax rate, leverage, operating cash flow, and annual loss, are related to fourth quarter differential effects in accrual volatility. We now discuss individual effects in more detail.
Insert Tables 3 Here
The ten explanatory variables in the "Earnings Management Drivers" group are identified in the literature as possible drivers of earnings management. For all ten drivers, Table 3 shows either estimates consistent with presence of earnings management, or statistically insignificant estimates under various levels of control for seasonal and industry factors. The first driver is regulation: a tighter regulatory environment reduces the firm's ability to manage accruals in general and in the fourth quarter specifically. Table 3 shows that the parameter estimates for regulation are negative and significant in both the crosssection and for the fourth quarter effect.
12
Literature suggests that firm size (Ave_A) and age are both positively associated with quality of information environment. 13 Therefore, these two earnings management drivers should be negatively associated with seasonal heteroskedasticity. Age is measured as the difference between the observation year and the first year the company's data appears in either COMPUSTAT or CRSP, whichever is earlier. Table 3 shows that age has the predicted sign and is statistically significant. Since we use the inverse of size (consistent with Jones, as above), the expected sign for the size measure in Table 3 is positive. The estimated effect is negative but statistically insignificant. Size is also insignificant when seasonal and industry dummies are omitted in specification 3.
Firms are required to make their best estimate of the effective tax rates expected to be applicable for the full fiscal year and then to apply these rates to interim income. The farther this rate is from the actual annual rate, the more fourth-quarter adjustment is needed. Hence, the variable Tax_diff is included in Panel (D) only. Tax_diff measures the difference between the average estimated rate in the first three quarters and the realized rate as of the end of the year, and normalizes the first three quarters to zero. This is an approximation of the surprise in the tax rate to the extent that tax rates estimated from data for the first three quarters are used to form expectations of annual rates. We expect that the surprise will require adjustments to taxes payable and deferred taxes, and hence have a positive impact on accrual volatility in the fourth quarter. Specification 2 shows that the effect of Tax_diff is positive and statistically significant, as predicted. Tax_diff continues to be significant when quarter and industry dummies are dropped. 14 It should be noted that regulation, size, age, and the fourth quarter tax rate surprise might all be viewed either as causing mechanical or as limiting discretionary adjustments. In either event they should be included if significant so that any adjustment effects will not be attributed to other regressors.
Higher audit quality should decrease cross-sectional accrual heteroskedasticity by increasing constraints on managers. The first three quarterly reports are simply reviewed, whereas annual earnings are typically fully audited by CPAs. If the fourth-quarter accrual volatility is mainly due to earnings management, higher quality auditing should decrease the discretion available to managers and decrease the variability of fourth-quarter discretionary accruals. We measure audit quality with a dummy variable for engaging a non-Big-5 audit firm (Auditor). Hence we expect that our proxy should have positive effects in both cross-section and fourth quarter. The results in Table 3 indicate that audit quality has the predicted sign in panel (C), but that the marginal impact is negative in the fourth quarter. The negative effect is only marginally (10%) significant when industry and seasonal dummies are excluded, and drops out entirely in specification (4).
We expect that looser bond covenant constraints measured in terms of debt/equity ratio will increase seasonal heteroskedasticity. We include two measures of leverage: Lev1 = total liabilities/total assets, and Lev2 = long-term debt/total assets. We include two measures because leverage can affect accrual variance in two different ways. Lev1 is expected to have a positive effect because it measures the short-term need to manage earnings either up to avoid technical default of debt covenants (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994) or down to facilitate renegotiation of debt contracts (DeAngelo, et al., 1994) . On the other hand, Lev2 is expected to have a negative effect because it proxies for restrictions placed by debt contracts on managers' choices of accounting procedures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Ch. 9 ) and creditors' general monitoring levels. Specification 2 shows that both leverage measures are statistically significant in the expected directions, both cross-sectionally and in the fourth quarter. Lev1 becomes insignificant in specification (4).
We include three measures of the effects of cash flows, all with positive expected effects. Our proxies for this effect include the firm-specific standard deviation of operating cash flow within firm (SD_OCF); a quarter-specific difference from firm's median operating cash flow, OCF_m = |current quarter operating cash flow -firm's median operating cash flow|; and a quarter-specific difference from industry median operating cash flow, OCF_indm = |current quarter operating cash flow -industry median of operating cash flow|. In general, higher variability of operating cash flow will lead to higher crosssectional and seasonal heteroskedasticity of accruals as managers strive to offset the variability and smooth income. Managers have several reasons for smoothing income, including bonus considerations (Healy, 1985) . All three cash flow measures are statistically significant in the expected direction in the cross section in specifications 2 to 4, but the fourth quarter results are mixed. Finally, firms showing a loss for the year will exhibit seasonal heteroskedasticity. We define Loss = 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise, and thus expect a positive effect. Basu, et al. (1997) suggested that losses contain more transitory elements. Chen and Lee (1995) find that bonus-related big baths take place in loss years. Our results indicate the loss effect is strongly positive in the fourth quarter, when year-end adjustments are made.
Although this list of earnings management drivers is likely not exhaustive, we have examined a fairly large set of drivers found in the literature. The overall results in Table 3 appear to support our working hypothesis that the difference in accrual volatility between the fourth quarter and the base period is attributable to earnings management. We provide additional evidence in support of this later, but for the moment proceed to construct PEM indices based on seasonal heterocedasticity.
Distributional Properties of Accrual Volatility
Since the construction of PEM indices is based on first-order stochastic dominance of fourth quarter accrual volatility over the other three quarters, we conduct a preliminary examination on the distributionsl properties of accrual volatility in Table 4 . Moreover, we examine how much the Jones Model for mechanical factors affects the distributional properties. We report the mean, standard deviation, first quartile, median, and third quartiles of the distributions. We conduct t-tests to examine the hypothesis that fourth quarter accrual volatility stochastically dominates the other three quarters. Since accrual volatility is not normally distributed, parametric t-tests may be biased. In the next subsection, we apply the nonparametric KS Distance to measure the first order stochastic dominance.
Insert Tables 4 Here
Panel A of Table 4 shows the distribution of ATA (absolute total accruals with no control for an important role in our measurement. This is comforting since a common criticism of the Jones Model is that it is ad hoc.
Insert Figure 1 Here Figure 1 provides a visual perspective of stochastic dominance. We draw the density curve and the cumulative density curve for ATA for three subsets of data: (1) the first subset is for the baseline period (the first three quarters of each fiscal year); (2) the second subset is for fourth quarters; and (3) the third subset is for fourth quarters for firms identified by SEC as suspects of earnings management (AAER sample). The distribution of the baseline sample serves as a benchmark where earnings management is not a serious concern. The first order stochastic dominance of the second subsample over the first indicates the pervasiveness of earnings management in our entire COMPUSTAT sample. Since the third subsample is associated with earnings management firms identified by SEC, if our PEM indices are useful we should find first order stochastic dominance of the AAER subsample over the other two. 15 Figure 1A illustrates the density curves of accrual volatility for the three samples, and Figure 1B illustrates the cumulative density curves. The KS Distance is the maximum distance between two cumulative density curves. It is obvious from Figure 1 that fourth quarter accrual volatility has first-order stochastic dominance over the baseline, and that the AAER sample exhibits first-order stochastic dominance over the other two samples. Figure 1 provides us confidence to move ahead. Table 5 presents the results for PEM1 to PEM3, computed according to subsection 2.3. Panel A of Table 5 reports the time series of PEM1 to PEM3 over 1988-1996 and Panel B reports the PEM indices across six industry categories. Both Panels A and B are derived from our entire COMPUSTAT sample.
PEM Indices
Panel C reports the PEM indices for the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) sample, which is a subsample of the entire COMPUSTAT sample. We first discuss Panel C, as this provides the validation that our measures capture earnings management.
Firms in the AAER file were identified by the SEC for reporting irregularities, and we coded our sample to reflect those accused of manipulating earnings in particular. We processed the AAER file to identify firms suspected of earnings management both in the actual year of the SEC enforcement action (Event-Year AAER) and ever in the sample period (All-Year AAER). If our working hypothesis is valid, the PEM indices for the AAER sample should be higher than those for the entire COMPUSTAT sample. If the evidence of illegal earnings manipulation should be strongest at the moment of enforcement, PEM indices for the Event-Year AAER would be somewhat higher than those in All-Year AAER. In all cases, PEM's for the AAER sample are substantially higher than PEM's for the entire sample, ranging from roughly 2 to 3 times as large. The significance levels are determined relative to the baseline sample for all COMPUSTAT firms. Hence, Panel C of Table 5 provides an external validity check on the relevance of our PEM indices: pervasiveness of earnings management in the AAER sample is significantly higher than that in the entire COMPUSTAT sample.
Insert Table 5 Here
Turning back to Panels A and B, overall the magnitude of PEM1 is higher than PEM2. (In each case, significance is determined relative to the baseline period distribution for the given subsample.) Hence it appears that the controls for annual mechanical accrual adjustments may also filter out some of discretionary accrual adjustments and reduce the power of the PEM index. Notice that both PEM1 and PEM2 lead to similar value for the AAER sample, whereas PEM1 is much higher than PEM2 in the entire sample. We can infer that when earnings management is widely present, PEM1 and PEM2 have equal power of detecting earnings management. However, when earnings management is sparse, PEM1 seems more powerful than PEM2 in detecting earnings management. PEM1, the index without control, is prone to Type II error, and PEM2, the index with control, is prone to Type I error. When earnings management is not a common phenomenon, Type I error that is associated with rejecting the hypothesis of earnings management should be more serious than Type II error. 16 When earnings management is common such as in the AAER sample, Type II error should be more serious than Type I error. Filtering the total accruals with the Jones Model may not be a good practice.
PEM1 and PEM2 are based on KS Distance, which is more powerful when the maximum distance is around the central location. PEM3 measures the difference between the distribution of fourth quarter accrual volatility and the other three quarters in the right tail of the distribution. We do not know the stochastic properties of PEM3 and hence cannot provide significance values. PEM3 is smaller than both PEM1 and PEM2. Hence far from being a phenomenon observed only in extreme cases, it appears that PEM measures based on distributional differences are strongest when the entire distribution is considered.
Overall, there is no clear time-series pattern evident in any of the PEM's. Contrary to the concerns expressed by Levitt (1998) , we cannot see clear trend on the pervasiveness of earnings management over the nine years between 1988 and 1996. PEM1 and PEM2 show no clear cross-sectional pattern either.
However, PEM3 indicates no sign of earnings management in the regulated industries . In fact, the fourth quarter accrual volatility in the 5% right tail is slightly lower than the other three quarters for firms in SIC 40-49. This indicates that regulated firms do not engage in extreme forms of earnings management to the same extent as unregulated firms. This appears to be an intuitively reasonable result.
Insert Table 6 Here
We use simulation to measure PEM4 and report the results in Table 6 . The derivation of PEM4 is based on the assumption that all doses of earnings management are of the same magnitude. We inject one or two standard deviations of accrual volatility into the accruals of first, second, or third quarters, and then measure the percentage of "injected" firms needed to reach the observed level of fourth quarter accrual volatility. For example, 34 in the first entry of Table 6 indicates that when 34 percent of firms are injected with one standard deviation of accrual volatility, the mean of first quarter accrual volatility with injection would be equal to the mean of observed fourth quarter accrual volatility. Another interpretation is this:
using the first quarter accrual volatility as a baseline for no earnings management, the fourth quarter accrual volatility in 1988 indicates that 34% of firms may conduct earnings management of one standard deviation magnitude, or 6% of firms may conduct earnings management of two standard deviations. Since the underlying assumption of independent identical earnings management of PEM4 is quite strong, we should interpret PEM4 as an ordinal measure, not a cardinal one.
3.Robustness and Relevance
Calendar vs. Fiscal Quarters
To make sure that our results are not driven by calendar quarters, we perform two additional tests.
First, we divide our sample into two subsamples: one with December year-end firms and the other with non-December year-end firms. The volatility of discretionary accruals is estimated from the Jones Model for each sample. Results almost identical to Table 5 are found. Discretionary accruals exhibit significantly higher volatility in the fourth fiscal quarter for both samples.
Second, we add a dummy variable for December year-end firms and an interaction variable of the fourth quarter dummy and the December year-end dummy in our tests reported in Table 3 . Then parameter estimate would capture the fourth-quarter effect of non-December year-end firms, and the sum of the coefficient for fourth quarter dummy and the coefficient for the interaction variable would capture the effect of December year-end firms. If our results were purely driven by calendar quarters, the coefficient for the interaction variable would be significantly positive and the estimated coefficient of fourth quarter dummy insignificant. Test results (not reported) show the opposite. The estimated coefficient of fourth quarter dummy remains significantly positive and the interaction variable is marginally negative instead of being positive.
Robustness Checks
PEM2 is calculated using the Jones Model to control for mechanical factors. The results show modest effects of these adjustments. We explored these specifications further in several ways to ensure that our results are representative of such adjustments. First, we used several alternative specifications of Jones
Model. These include a modified Jones Model incorporating seasonal effects as well as interactions between the seasonal effects and economic variables. We also tried squared residuals in place of absolute values. 17 In addition, we also ran extensive tests based on additional controls for mechanical factors that could drive heterscedasticity. That is, in addition to the Jones Model filter, we ran an additional regression using the absolute value of the Jones Model residuals as the dependent variable, and controlling for nonearnings-management based factors. We then used the residual from this second stage regression to find PEM's. Again, these additional steps did not yield qualitatively different results. We examined the effect of our choice of a 5% cutoff for the baseline distribution in PEM3 by using a 1% cutoff, as well. The results were qualitatively similar to those presented here.
Case Studies on Firms with Large Accrual Volatility
Finally, we conducted case studies based on a set of firms suggested by our PEM indices as likely suspects for earnings management. To identify suspect of earnings management, we used the simplest underlying basis for PEM, namely total accruals. Using fourth quarter data, we chose the 5 largest positive and 5 largest negative (scaled by assets) total accrual firms from the COMPUSTAT. These firms were identified independently of the AAER sample discussed above, and do not overlap with that sample. Hence they provide additional independent verification of our results. Table 7 presents information about these firms. Several patterns emerge from these case studies. First, all 5 negative accrual cases follow several years of losses. In all cases, there were significant write-down or restructuring charges. Four of the five firms had top management turnover near the accrual date. These factors are consistent with a "big bath" scenario. It is worth noting that the next largest negative accrual firm, DYCOM Industries, was investigated for possible violations by the SEC in the year before the large accrual, and was involved in lawsuits with several dismissed top officers regarding the value of their incentive pay. This firm may have had an incentive to reduce income to avoid paying compensation.
Insert Table 7 Here
The positive accrual cases also show interesting patterns. In four of the five cases, net income would have been negative without large accruals, so the accruals were large enough to change losses into positive earnings. In three cases, firms were issuing equity near the time of the accrual. Though the pattern is not as consistent as for losses, these may be firms with an interest in reporting income rather than loss. In one case, though the fourth quarter accrual was positive, the previous 7 quarters were all large negative accruals, and this firm (International American Homes) appears to fit the negative accrual pattern. It is interesting to note that, although we selected this sample by the absolute magnitude of accruals, most firms in this sample have a recent history of poor operating performance. The two firms that reported two consecutive years of income appear to be associated with seasoned equity offerings and financial restructurings.
Conclusions
We construct four indices to measure the pervasiveness of earnings management based on the premise that earnings management leads to first-order stochastic dominance of fourth quarter accrual volatility over the other three quarters. Our empirical results provide evidence to support this working hypothesis. Applying the four PEM indices to the entire COMPUSTAT sample and to the AAER subsample, we find that these indices are useful at least in ordinal measurement. Since these four indices measure different aspects of first-order stochastic dominance, they do not lead to uniform cardinal results.
However, they do provide consistent ordinal measure.
This paper builds on the quarterly pattern of financial variables cited in the literature to derive measures for assessing the pervasiveness of earnings management. As a result, our study provides new insight into the literature. Salamon and Stober's (1994) result that fourth-quarter earnings response coefficients are smaller than interim-quarter response coefficients is attributable to the higher accrual volatility in the fourth quarter. We provide direct support to Salomon and Stober's (1994, p. 326) conjecture that fourth-quarter earnings contain more earnings management than earnings from other quarters. Mendenhall and Nichols' (1988) explained the lower market reaction to the fourth-quarter bad news by the less severity of the news. In light of our study, a piece of bad news of the same severity could trigger a smaller market reaction in the fourth quarter due to the more volatile and noisy earnings signal.
This interpretation is also consistent with Palepu's (1988, p. 90) conjecture. Our findings may explain why financial analysts and various forecasting models have larger forecast errors for fourth-quarter earnings given the same forecast horizon (Collins, et al., 1984; and Basu, et al., 1997) : namely, more active earnings management in the fourth quarter. Our findings have implications for evaluating studies of earnings management based on quarterly data. When higher levels of discretionary accruals are identified in the fourth quarter (e.g. Han and Wang, 1998) , one must take into account the higher underlying variability in determining statistical significance of event-specific earnings management. Otherwise, the statistical significance would be overstated.
In light of 2002 Enron debacle, the pervasiveness of earnings management, the quality of financial reporting, the nature of the informational environment, and the effectiveness of accounting standards have become a national concern. This paper provides a set of intuitive methods to address these important issues.
Overall, there is no clear time-series pattern evident in any of the PEM indices over the nine years between 1988 and 1996. PEM1 and PEM2 show no clear cross-sectional pattern either. However, PEM3 indicates no sign of earnings management in the regulated industries . Hence, firms under regulation appear less likely to engage in extreme forms of earnings management than unregulated firms. Hopefully, our PEM indices provide a useful tool for assessing earnings quality, accounting standard, and public policy for future studies.
Notes
1 In a speech delivered at New York University, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt (1998) criticized the "widespread but too little challenged custom: earnings management." His comment reflected the increasing concern by the SEC and the investment community over the quality of financial disclosure.
2 Since scientific inquiries involve unknown and oftentimes unobservable subjects, scientists need to design approaches that are often indirect in nature to measure the subjects of interest. Measurement is the first step for scientific inquiry. Abundant examples of ingeniously indirect method can be found in studies of science history such as Stigler (1986) and Woolf (1961) .
3 Practitioner street wisdom suggests that most of earnings management take place at year-end under the pressure of meeting performance expectations and various compliance requirements (see Investor Relations Business, 2001) . It is worth noting at the outset, though, that our methods are more likely to capture earnings management that is characterized by fiscal year end adjustments, when most of the facts are known to management and they react with adjustments purely reflecting choices of recognition timing, rather than long-horizon planning such as might be involved in minimizing tax burden, for example. Givoly and Ronen (1981) show that the magnitude of unexpected fourth-quarter earnings is smaller than that for first three quarters due to income smoothing. Elliott and Shaw (1988) document that 63% of write-offs are recognized during the fourth quarter. Bartov (1993) finds a similar pattern for asset sales. Liu, et al. (1997) show that only discretionary loan loss provisions by low-regulatory capital banks in the fourth quarter are regarded as good news by the stock market. Cornell and Landsman (1989) , Kross and Schroeder (1990) , Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) , and Salamon and Stober (1994) find mixed results as to whether the stock market reacts differently to the fourth-quarter earnings announcements than to those of interim quarters. Dechow (1994) shows that accounting accruals are important factors for the year-end measure of firm performance. 4 Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) use AAER's to identify a sample with probable earnings management, which they use to test the relative power of several models used to detect earnings management.
5 Annual earnings are the primary goal of financial reporting and are explicitly used in most earnings-based contracts.
Given that annual earnings is the main target of earnings management, the optimal timing for the management activities may be in the last quarter of fiscal year. In addition to earnings management through "cooking the books,"
substantive transactions are also more likely to be made later in the year to affect the reported earnings. For example, R & D can be cut in the second half of a fiscal year when it appears that annual earnings may fall below expectations (Foster, 1986) . With only a few exceptions (e.g. Han and Wang, 1998; Rangan, 1998) , most earnings management studies are based on annual earnings.
6 ∆Rev = change in revenue (Compustat item #2), ∆AR = change in receivables (#37), PPE = property, plant and equipment (#118), Ave_A = average assets = (A t + A t-1 )/2, where A = total assets (#44). Total accruals (TA) are measured as the difference between net income before extraordinary items (#8) and operating cash flows (#108).
Variables other than Ave_A are scaled with lagged assets. We tried several additional specification including quarter dummies and interactions of quarter dummies with main variables to see the effects of allowing seasonal patterns within the mean-shifting effects. These specifications did not yield substantially different results.
7 Indices generally are normalized (and hence scale-free) to facilitate interpretation, but few have known stochastic properties. 8 We also calculated the cutoff using the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of the distribution for the first 3 quarters, and using θ = µ + 1.645*σ. The results are slightly higher than those reported in this paper.
9 For firms without #108, operating cash flows are determined by OCF = fund from operations (#82) -∆current assets (#40) + ∆current liabilities (#49) +∆cash (#36) -∆current portion of long-term debt (#45). 10 We do not consider residual autocorrelation in our regressions as in Han and Wang (1998) for several reasons. First, we run regressions within each year rather than pooled across years as in their study. The significant fourth order autocorrelation they find does not apply here. Second, the Durbin-Watson statistics for our regressions are generally insignificant. Third, for small autocorrelation (less than 0.30 in this study), OLS estimation is as efficient as FGLS or Maximum likelihood estimation (Greene, 1997) .
11 It should be noted that we face ambiguity as to whether these drivers are mechanical or discretionary in some cases.
Even if some of these drivers are more fairly characterized as mechanical, it is appropriate to include them as control variables for measuring the effect of true earnings management drivers. 12 We define Regulation = 1 if the firm is in 3-digit SIC 481, 491-494; 0 otherwise. 13 Small and young firms usually have greater degree of information asymmetry than large and old firms (Bhushan, 1989) . When information asymmetry is more severe, earnings management has been shown to be more active (Richardson, 1997) . The higher variation of many financial variables of small and young firms provides camouflage for more active earnings management. In addition, larger and old firms are subject to more scrutiny in the political process (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and thus have less discretion to manage earnings.
14 To control for mechanical year-end accruals, we also included two similarly constructed variables for operating cycle and inventory cycle effects in the fourth quarter, but neither variable was statistically significant, and we discarded them. 15 We also found the ATA distribution for the first three quarters for AAER firms to be sure that the difference between AAER fourth quarters and baseline ATA's does not simply reflect higher accrual volatility for AAER sample firms in all quarters. The baseline period ATA distribution for AAER firms is very close to the overall baseline. We omit this from the figures. 16 For simplicity of interpretation, we take the subject of our measurement (i.e., the presence of earnings management) [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] period. Subsamples are based on size (measured by average book value of assets) and fiscal quarters. Variables are defined as follows: Average assets = Total assets (#44) at time t plus total assets at time t-1 divided by 2. Net Income = Net income before extraordinary items (#8).TA (total accruals) = NI -OCF, where OCF = operating cash flows (#108). In cases where #308 is not available, OCF is measured as funds from operations (#82) -∆Current assets (#40) + ∆Current liabilities (#49) + ∆Cash(#36) -∆Current portion of long-term debt (#45). ∆Rev = change in revenue (#2). ∆A/R = change in receivables (#37). PPE = gross property, plant and equipment (#118). All variables are scaled with lagged assets where appropriate, as indicated. Note: ***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed) respectively. a 436 regressions are run for each combination of 2-digit SIC code and fiscal year. Variable definitions: TA (total accruals) = NI -OCF, where NI = net income before extraordinary items(#8). ∆Rev = change in revenue (#2). ∆A/R = change in receivables (#37). PPE = gross property, plant and equipment (#118).
Ave_A = average assets = (total assets at t + total assets at t-1) /2 (#44). The residuals from the Jones Model are used as the estimated discretionary accruals (DA) for PEM2. All variables except Ave_A are scaled by lagged assets. b The parametric test is the two-tailed t-test for zero mean. The non-parametric is the two-tailed sign test for equal number of positive and negative signs. 
